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Exploiting Innovative Technology in Offshore Markets:
A U.S. Perspective*
Leonard B. Mackey**
This Paper is directed to approaches for exploiting innovative technology in offshore markets with particular attention to transferring technology by licensing. More particularly, licensing from the United States
to developed and developing countries is discussed, together with observations on the legal, and where significant, political environment for
transferring technology. This is followed by a brief description of a system for financing and managing development of new technology, an example of successful multinational development and exploitation of
innovative technology by licensing.
Attention is directed to western European countries in the European
Economic Community ("EEC") because the EEC is a significant market
for the United States. The size of the EEC market exceeds that of the
United States and it is a market with which the United States carries on a
very significant portion of its overseas business. Moreover, the EEC is
directing substantial efforts toward achieving by 1992 a unified market
with no internal trade barriers. The potential result of these efforts is of
concern to businesses outside the EEC. There is concern that those
outside the EEC may experience substantial barriers to doing business in
the EEC. Licensing may provide an effective means for exploiting technology in the EEC.
Comments will also be directed to licensing in a developing country,
and to a few of the challenges and difficulties that may be experienced
when licensing into a developing country.
EXPLOITING TECHNOLOGY

Essentially, there are two approaches for exploiting innovative technology in an offshore market. One approach is to embody the technology
in products or services and export these products or services to the market. The second approach is to license, transferring the technology, together with intellectual property licenses, to an offshore entity. The
entity may be a foreign firm or person, or a joint venture, possibly involving an equity contribution to the joint venture by the licensor. This Paper is directed to licensing.
* © 1989 Leonard B. Mackey
** Vice-President and General Patent Counsel, ITT Corporation.
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What and When to License
The most essential ingredient of a successful licensing program, in
addition to a politically and economically receptive environment in the
country of the prospective licensee, is the availability of a commercially
proven product or service together with a researched and established
need in a prospective licensee country for the product or service. Generally, only commercially successful products or services should be considered for licensing.
Ideally, before being licensed a technology should have been fully
developed, debugged and successfully marketed as a product or service in
the home country of the licensor, with licensing undertaken as an alternative to exporting the product or service to the licensee country. Licensing of uncommercialized technology often amounts to the mere
selling of inventive, innovative or engineering "services" at a relatively
low price, compared to the price that can and should be realized from
licensing a commercially developed product or service embodying the
technology.
Whether to License
An exporter of a product or service from the United States can expect its access to a foreign market to be limited or at least made difficult
by import duties, failure of its product to meet local standards, lack of
knowledge of and access to local channels of distribution and a myriad of
tariff and non-tariff barriers to successfully and profitably accessing the
market. An offshore licensee should facilitate access to the local market
in which it is based since it does not experience tariff barriers. Furthermore, the offshore licensee can be expected to have knowledge of and
access to the necessary channels of distribution, in addition to full knowledge of local standards and how to meet these standards.
A thorough discussion of considerations involved in the exploitation
of a product or service in an overseas market, whether or not to license,
what and when to license and how to license is beyond the scope of this
Paper. However, an excellent analysis and checklist appears in the Licensing Law Handbook.'
UNITED STATES LAWS AND REGULATIONS

The environment for transferring technology from the United States
in most instances is relatively permissive. Licenses will rarely be required for exports to the free world and the licensing requirements for
most of the rest of the world, with the exception of a few specifically
embargoed nations, have been substantially eased and streamlined.
Transfer of technology from the United States to an overseas destination is now governed by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
I
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of 1988 ("1988 Act").' The 1988 Act was preceded by the Export Administration Act of 1979 ("1979 Act"), as amended in 1985.1 Under the
1979 Act, the President could control exports for national security, foreign policy and short supply reasons.
A National Academy of Science panel on National Security Controls reported in 1987 that it found inadequacies in the export control
process and recommended reforms. The panel found that the export
controls tended to damage the U.S. economy without improving national
security. This caused Congress to undertake reform efforts before the
normal expiration of the amended 1979 Act, and these reforms are reflected in the 1988 Act.
The result of the 1988 Act is a very substantial reduction in the
licensing requirements and a streamlining of procedures for the export or
re-export of most U.S. technical data. However, technology and products having military significance remain controlled by the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations.4
Under the 1988 Act, a company or person wishing to export or reexport U.S. technical data anywhere in the world needs to review the
U.S. Department of Commerce Export Administration Regulations to
determine whether an export license is required. If the data is controlled
for a particular destination, the exporter or licensor must apply for and
receive an export license. Thus, the transfer of goods, provision of services and transfer of technology from the United States to the free world is
essentially without restriction unless the goods, services or technology
are of potential military significance.
Background on the U.S. regulation of trade in both the free world
and in the east and west is analyzed in a paper by John Ellicott, Competitive Impact of US. Export ControlRegulations.' Moreover, an excellent
guide to the export controls dictated by the 1988 Act appears in a U.S.
Chamber of Commerce publication, The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, A StraightForward Guide to Its Impact on US. and
ForeignBusiness.'
LOCAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS

A significant aspect of technology transfer and licensing into an offshore market is the laws and regulations of the government which directly affects licensing agreements in the market, particularly the terms
and conditions which such laws and regulations consider permissible.
These laws and regulations are often complex and subject to local
2 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
3 Pub. L. No. 69-72 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 Supp. 1987).
4 International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. § 120 (1988).
5 14 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 63 (1988).
6 U.S.

1988 (1988).
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interpretation, modification and application. Accordingly, there is no
substitute for professional review of a proposed licensing arrangement in
an offshore market, including review of applicable laws and regulations
at the time the technology transfer is contemplated.
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

A major market is the European Economic Community, often referred to as the Common Market, which was established in early 1958
pursuant to the Treaty of Rome ("Treaty") which was signed on March
25, 1957. 7 The EEC is composed of the following twelve member countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal.
The EEC can be viewed as similar to the United States in that each
member country is like a state in the United States. It is the intent of the
Treaty that there be no barriers to commerce, e.g., a free flow of goods
among the member countries - as between states in the United States.
This absence of barriers to trade among the member countries has not yet
been effected, but a significant effort is being expended to achieve this
result by the end of 1992.
This "free flow" of goods and services among the member countries
is treated in articles 9 and 10 and in articles 30-35 of the Treaty. However, unlike the United States, each country has its own patent system.
The existence of and accommodation of the patent system in each country is reflected in article 36 of the Treaty which permits inter alia restrictions on movements of goods based on the protection of industrial
property, e.g., a patent.
The EEC has an antitrust law. The most pertinent provision relating to technology transfer is article 85 of the Treaty. Enforcement of the
EEC Competition Rules rests primarily with the European Commission
("Commission"), the executive branch of the European Community.
Article 85(1) of the Treaty prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between member countries and which have
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the EEC. Article 85(2) renders agreements or decisions,
prohibited pursuant to article 85(1), null and void. However, article
85(3) introduces a "rule of reason" whereby the prohibitions of article
85(1) may be declared inapplicable by the Commission when an agree7 Treaty of Rome (EEC), Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 9, 10, 30-36, 85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, reprintedin
1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
200-399, 2000-2199; EEC Council: Regulation No. 17: First Regulation Implementing articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 13 0. J. EUR. COMM. 204 (1962), reprinted in
Common Mkt. Rep.
2400-2660, 2698-2726; EEC: Regulation No. 27 of the Commission: First
Regulation Implementing Council Regulation No. 17 of 6 February 1962, 35 O.J. EUR. COMM. 1118
(1962), reprinted in Common Mkt. Rep. 12651-61, 2821, 2823-25.
8 1. VAN BAEL & J. BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EEC (1988).
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ment, decision or concerted practice prohibited by the terms of article
85(1) contributes to the improvement of the production of goods or to
the promotion of technical or economic progress, while reserving to users
an equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom.
The implementation of article 85 is covered by Regulation 17. Regulation 17 provides inter alia the procedures for obtaining Commission
exemption (negative clearance) with respect to an agreement or undertaking, and for fines for violation of article 85.
Block Exemptions
Pursuant to the terms of the Treaty of Rome and Regulation 17,
formal Commission clearance of many contemplated business arrangements is required to avoid risk of significant fines and possible injunctions. This imposes on businesses, prospective licensees and the
Commission staff an almost impossible burden.
To meet this burden, Regulation No. 19/65/EEC9 was enacted.
This regulation empowers the Commission to apply article 85(3) of the
Treaty of Rome by special regulation to certain categories of agreements
and concerted practices falling within the scope of article 85(1). Pursuant to Regulation 19/65/EEC, a series of "block exemption" regulations
have been enacted, against which a proposed business plan or license
agreement can be compared to determine whether it is necessary to seek
formal negative clearance from the Commission.
Among the block exemptions relating to commerce are exemptions
relating to exclusive distributor agreements,10 exclusive purchase agreements,1 specialization agreements, 12 joint R&D and joint exploitation of
R&D results, 13 patent license agreements' 4 and know-how license

agreements. 15
9 See Regulation No. 19/65/EEC of the Council on Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty
to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices, 36 O.J. EUR. CoMM. 533 (1965).
10 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1983/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Distribution Agreements, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (N6. L
173) 1 (1983).
11 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
173) 5 (1983).
12 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 417/85 of 19 December 1984 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Specialization Agreements, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
53) 1 (1985).
13 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 418/85 of 19 December 1984 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Research and Development Agreements, 28 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 53) 5 (1985).
14 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 219) 15 (1984).
15 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-How Licensing Agreements, 32 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 61) 1 (1989).
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Block Exemption-PatentLicense Agreements and
Know-How License Agreements
The block exemption regulation for patent license agreements and
the block exemption regulation for know-how license agreements are of
particular interest when licensing an entity in the EEC. If an agreement
meets the "requirements" of the block exemption, notice to the Commission and formal Commission "approval" (negative clearance) of the
agreement pursuant to 85(3) is not required to avoid the risk of the agreement being declared null and void, and of a fine pursuant to Regulation
17.
These two regulations are similarly structured, but differ in detail
since the nature of a patent or industrial property right differs from that
of proprietary industrial know-how. However, the regulations overlap
and a mixed patent and know-how agreement requires careful analysis to
determine which regulation to apply in determining whether formal negative clearance needs to be obtained.
The principal focus of each of these block exemption regulations is
on specified license agreement provisions. There is a "white list" of provisions, i.e. provisions which can be included in a license agreement without violating article 85(1). Each of the regulations lists license provisions
falling within a "black list," i.e. provisions which will preclude application of the regulation. However, the existence of a "black list" provision
in an agreement, while precluding application of the block exemption
regulation, does not necessarily preclude eventual Commission approval
of an agreement under 85(3) upon application for negative clearance pursuant to Regulation 17.
In addition to the regulations imposed by the EEC, each of the
countries has its own patent system, technical standards and local regulations which have to be dealt with in order to pursue a business. Thus, the
EEC, as viewed in the United States, is a highly regulated business environment with complex rules and regulations. The EEC Competition
Law was conceived with considerable guidance from U.S. antitrust and
regulatory officials at a time of relatively vigorous antitrust enforcement
in the United States and Commission regulations reflect this guidance.
However, the recent adoption of the various block exemption regulations, which reflect business and practical realities, indicates an easing
of the more restrictive regulations imposed on business in earlier times.
The foregoing comments are advanced with the caveat that the EEC
regulations on patent license agreements and know-how agreements are
complex and many provisions have yet to be interpreted by Commission
or International Court of Justice decisions.
Some of the much publicized "1992 plans" for the EEC call for
common technical standards, a single patent system, no tariff barriers
among member states and eventually a common currency. However,
tariff and non-tariff barriers may be erected against outsiders, and this
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may make licensing technology more attractive than exporting products
or services to these countries.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Developing countries have in many instances established laws and
regulations which strictly regulate technology transfer and do little to
encourage the import of technology.
An aspect of the philosophy of some developing countries is that
technology is the common patrimony of mankind; it should be given
away or available at nominal cost. With this philosophy, a multinational
company is viewed as having received full benefit from exploiting a technology in its home market before licensing the technology in a developing country. Therefore, any licensing royalty income is pure profit, and
if significant, exploitative.
From industry's viewpoint, technology is property developed to provide products and services at a profit. Without profit, there are no funds
to stay in business, conduct research or develop and bring to market new
products and services. Moreover, most research results are of little or no
value, therefore the few instances of successful research must see a profitable return.
For example, the laws and regulations of Brazil are generally viewed
by the industry in developed countries as too restrictive, emphasizing
control and regulation and often forcing an unacceptable burden on any
prospective transfer of technology into Brazil. The regulations and laws
are often so burdensome that an enterprise in a developed country will
decide that the prospects for a mutually profitable technology transfer
are so slight that it is not worth trying to facilitate a technology transfer
into Brazil.
Why should an enterprise in a developed country enter into a licensing and business deal when: 1) it cannot realize a return equivalent to
that which it would earn on a developed country to developed country
licensing arrangement; 2) confidential treatment of proprietary technology is not assured; 3) earnings from investment in the developing country
or licensing fees cannot easily be repatriated; and 4) export restrictions
cannot be imposed on a licensed enterprise in a country even when the
absence of such restrictions would impinge on rights already granted by
the licensor to a licensee in another country.
Moreover, regulations relating to software are enforced by severe
penalties. 6 For instance, the penalty for importing, displaying and keeping in storage for commercial purposes, software of foreign origin which
is not recorded with the Special Secretariat for Informaties ("SCI"), is
imprisonment for a term of one to four years and a fine.
There are many instances of regulation overkill in developing coun16 Daniel, Realities of Licensing in Brazil, LEs NOUVELLES 71 (June 1988).
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tries. This is perceived as counter-productive to a country's interest.
Technology transfer needs to be facilitated, not merely regulated and
controlled by national laws and regulations.
Efforts are under way in many developing countries to mitigate the
chilling effect of regulations on licensing while retaining those regulations
and controls necessary to meet national objectives. This is encouraging
and to be applauded.
MANAGING AND FINANCING DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY

Need
A multinational company with subsidiary companies in different
countries needs a system for managing and funding the research and development needed to be and remain competitive. In many countries, the
business product lines are too small to support the necessary research by
an expenditure of a percentage of the sales of a product in the country.
Moreover, research must be managed and coordinated to ensure the effective use of manpower and funds and to minimize overlaps and gaps.
Intra-CompanyAgreements
Meeting these needs can be accomplished with a system of intracompany agreements called General Relations Agreements ("GRA").
PARENT
COMPANY
SYSTEM
Co.
A

SYSTEM
Co.COC.
BCD

SSTM

S

TE

Figure 1
The parent company has a GRA with each company A, B, C and D,
which are each located in a different country. These GRAs provide:
1) Funding of worldwide research and development activities
through research and development assessment. This assessment is
the same in each line of business for all companies.
2) Assessments paid into a General Development Fund which is administered and distributed by the parent company to its subsidiaries to enable them to conduct research and development of mutual
interest, business line by business line. Assessment contributions
to the General Development Fund are the same for each line of
business in all subsidiaries. The rates vary by business from a fraction of a percent of sales in a commodity type business, to in excess of 5% of sales, in a business with high-cost research and
development requirements, e.g., telecommunications.
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3)

Controlled royalty-free two-way flow of technical information and

intellectual property rights from the parent company to all subsidiaries engaged in the same product lines. For example, the GRA
provides that Company A shall have the royalty-free right to ob-

tain and use any technical information pertinent to its business
which is developed by the parent company or by companies B, C

and D. Similarly, the GRA provides that the parent company and
the other companies shall have royalty-free rights to obtain and

use any pertinent technical information developed by A. The only
cost to a company receiving technical information is to reimburse
the company providing the information for its out-of-pocket transfer costs.
All subsidiaries participate with the parent company in deciding on
the location to carry out research and development, what research and
development will be undertaken and the level of funding.
Taxes
The research and development assessment is treated by the parent
company and each subsidiary as a business expense, and thus, is sheltered
from tax. There have been challenges from some country administrations that the assessment should be treated, and taxed, as a royalty payment or as a disguised distribution of profits. However, these challenges
have been met, and a GRA system of managed and funded research accepted when the speculative nature of the use of the assessment was explained. That is, the assessment payments are for research and
development not yet conducted, the results of which are unknown and in
most instances unpredictable. Moreover, this system of funding has been
Cooperation and Developrecognized by the Organization for Economic
17
ment in its 1979 report on transfer pricing.
Benefits
The benefits for each business, in each subsidiary company, are significant. In return for a contribution of a relatively low percentage of the
sales of each business, the results of research and development in each
central laboratory, as well as the results of research and development at
each subsidiary company, are available to all the companies for their use
as needed for their businesses. This is available without further cost, beyond the out-of-pocket cost of transferring the technology. Thus, each
company's R&D investment is effectively multiplied many times.
Since each member of the GRA system actively participates in the
planning and performance of research and development efforts for its
own businesses, the results of these efforts directly relate to each subsidiary's individual interests. Moreover, the conduct by a subsidiary com17 Transfer Pricingand MultinationalEnterprises,Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal
Affairs 102-124 (1979).
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pany of General Development Funded research significantly enhances
the company's assimilation of technology obtained from other participants in the GRA system, as well as its own technological development.
Therefore, the pooled research increases the efficiency of the use of
research and development funds and personnel. The GRA System has
proven to be an effective intra-company vehicle for financing and managing research and development in a multinational multi-product
corporation.
EXPLOITING RESULTING TECHNOLOGY

An example of pooled research and development by a multinational
company was the conception and development of a next generation distributed control digital telephone switching system. The initial conception and development of the system and the related basic software took
place in the United States; commercial embodiments were then developed in U.S., Belgian and German laboratories. The first production of a
commercial system was in a Belgian factory. The system was initially
marketed in Western Europe.
Objective
The intent was to manufacture and sell this equipment to telephone
administrators throughout the world. A potential customer country was
the Peoples Republic of China ("PRC") which had identified telecommunications as critical to the industrial development of the PRC. A subsidiary of the multinational company actively sought to participate in the
PRC telecommunications endeavor by supplying the PRC with its digital
telephone switching equipment.
The Licensing Decision
An essential element of the PRC programs involving critical technologies was for the PRC to become as self-sufficient as possible in these
technologies. Accordingly, a condition imposed by the PRC for buying
the equipment was that the supplier also had to agree to assist PRC personnel to become competent to manufacture the digital telephone switching equipment. Therefore, in order to gain access to the PRC market,
the telephone switching equipment licensor agreed to participate in the
formation of a joint venture manufacturing company ("JVC") and to
transfer technology to the JVC and license it. Thus, the motivation for
licensing an entity in the PRC rather than merely selling equipment was
that licensing was the only way to enter the PRC market.
The principal motivations of the PRC for entering into this joint
venture and licensing arrangement included rapidly gaining self-sufficiency in a new technology and the preservation of foreign currency. In
addition, there were corollary benefits to the self-sufficiency which included strengthening and broadening the scientific and technological
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base of the PRC, training engineers and technicians in new technologies,
facilitating the assimilation of modem management, manufacturing and
quality control techniques, creating new employment and development
opportunities and upgrading support industries to provide the JVC with
parts and services.
The Deal
The overall agreement reached between the licensor, a western European company, and the Peoples Republic of China called for establishment of a Chinese JVC, initial delivery of a substantial number of lines of
completely manufactured digital telephone switching equipment, transfer
of technology and grant of licenses necessary for the Chinese JVC to
manufacture the digital telephone switching equipment, the supply, during an initial period following start-up of manufacture, of critical piece
parts and components for the manufacture of the equipment, and the
training of Chinese personnel to manage and operate the JVC.
Laws and Regulations
Among the requirements to be met in the formation of the joint venture and the transfer of sophisticated U.S. and European technology to
the JVC were the many approvals required by various government
agencies.
PRC Controls and Regulations
In order to encourage and facilitate the formation of joint ventures,
the transfer of technology and the protection of industrial property, the
PRC has enacted laws and issued regulations which provide the legal and
regulatory framework for such activities.18 A significant amount of time
and effort was expended meeting the requirements of these laws and regulations, and persuading the PRC authorities that such requirements had
been met.
18 The most pertinent laws and regulations in effect at the time this contract was negotiated
were:
* The Law of the Peoples Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment - Dated July 1, 1979.
* Income Tax Law of the Peoples Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures with
Chinese and Foreign Investment - Dated September 10, 1980.
* The Income Tax Treaty Between the United States of America and the Peoples Republic of China.
* Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the Peoples Republic of China on
Joint Ventures - Dated September 20, 1983.
* The Patent Law of the Peoples Republic of China - Dated March 12, 1984 (Effective
April 1, 1985).
* The October 11, 1986 Provisions of the States Council of the Peoples Republic of China
for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment.
For an update, see Pierce, The Legal Regime for Technology Imports in the Peoples Republic of
China, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REP. 206-215 (1988).
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Licensor and Related Government Regulations
Since most of the technology to be transferred to the JVC originated
in the United States, Belgium and Germany, approval by COCOM and
the U.S. government was required. Due to the advanced state of the art
of the critical technology embodied in the licensed system, a substantial
amount of time and effort was expended in reaching agreement with U.S.
Government authorities on conditions that would have to be imposed on
the licensee JVC in order to obtain U.S. government approval for the
transfer of critical technology, and negotiating acceptance of these conditions by the Chinese government authorities.
Some of the significant features of the License Agreement were the
following:
Guarantees
The essence of the License Agreement with the JVC was to transfer
to the JVC Licensee all technology, know-how, technical assistance and
management training necessary to manufacture digital telephone switching equipment having the same quality, capacity and characteristics as
the equipment produced by Licensor. The Chinese authorities insisted
that the Licensor give a guarantee along the following lines:
Licensor guarantees that the Contract Equipment [digital telephone
switching equipment] manufactured by the Licensee shall have the
same quality, capacity and characteristics as the one produced by Licensor, provided the conditions [of the License Agreement] are complied with by the Licensee and provided further that the Licensee
meets Licensor's standards of quality, and strictly complies with the
process sheets, manufacturing, installation, testing and maintenance
standards and methods as used by Licensor.
From the viewpoint of the JVC Licensee, this was a reasonable requirement. From the viewpoint of the Licensor, it involved considerable
risk, particularly in view of the lack, at the time the Agreement was
signed, of the necessary factory building, machinery, infrastructures and
skilled and trained personnel. The major portion of the technology fee
payable to the Licensor was, in effect, held hostage to this guarantee.
The guarantee was given, the risk undertaken and ultimately the guarantee was met.
Documentation
In order to transfer the technology and know-how used by the Licensor in its factories, a special organized documentation system was established to assure that the Licensee would be provided with a complete
package of hardware and software documentation relating to the production, design, assembly, operation, installation, testing and maintenance of
the licensed equipment used by the Licensor to produce the equipment in
its own factory.
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Training
In order to assure that the JVC achieved the required production
standards, JVC personnel were enrolled in long-term training programs,
most of which were conducted in the Licensor's home factory. These
personnel were trained in manufacturing, engineering, installation and
maintenance. Selection of educated, educable and motivated Licensee
trainees was crucial to assure the effectiveness of the training programs
and to realize the objective of the JVC. The success to date of the venture attests to the effectiveness of the selection process and the training
program.
Licenses
An exclusive license was granted to make, use and sell the licensed
equipment in the PRC. No export rights were granted. However, it was
agreed that export rights could be granted as decided by the JVC Board
of Directors on a case-by-case basis. This was the best result that could
be achieved in view of the general requirement that there be no restriction on exports.
Compensation
The agreement provided for payment of royalties in U.S. dollars
computed as a percentage of sales of licensed digital telephone switching
equipment during the term of the Agreement. When the agreed "ceiling" dollar amount of royalties has been paid, the license is paid in full.
Anticipated and Realized Results
The JVC assimilated technology at a more rapid pace than initially
planned, and this was manifested by the JVC factory reaching its production capacity objective more than six months ahead of schedule. The
assembly, test, maintenance and customer design capability has been
fully realized.
Thus, from the viewpoint of the PRC, it has assimilated and now
has available in the PRC the benefits of highly sophisticated technology
developed at great cost by the Licensor together with skills and knowhow for manufacturing sophisticated telecommunications equipment.
From the viewpoint of the Licensor, it has gained access to the PRC
market through the licensing of its technology and is realizing royalty
income and a share of the joint venture profits.
This has been an overview of a few aspects of exploiting innovative
technology in offshore markets by licensing, with brief visits to the European Common Market, to a developing country and to the People's Republic of China.
In selected instances licensing is an effective vehicle for exploiting
innovative technology in offshore markets.

